

THE PLAIN VIEW



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COMMENTARY

THE RECKONING. One general principle which should rule Allied treatment of Germany derives from the perception that historical causes are multiple and complex. Rough justice is not just, and makes bad politics. The German people started the war and are responsible for what has happened to Europe. It is common policy, expressed in the demand for unconditional surrender, that Germany must bear the consequences not merely of her defeat but also of her criminal responsibility for unprovoked aggression. Her treatment as a criminal is unprecedented in character and implies the new view of war which took shape after 1918. But the fact of German responsibility does not mean that Germany is the simple cause of the war, a line of thought which leads easily to the generalization that Germany is the cause of war, there is something in German nature or German history which causes war: take away Germany and there is no war; add Germany and there is war. German responsibility means that German public opinion did not in good faith renounce war as an instrument of policy. This may seem to be an absurd and dangerous understatement of German guilt. It is likely that sober historical analysis will attribute such a meaning to German guilt. And it is enough.

The two major factors in the causation of the war which were specifically German were the military tradition embodied in the General Staff, and the character of German political thought. These two factors, dangerous as they were and accountable for them as Germany must be, were qualified by a sense of responsibility which made them far less dangerous than they have seemed to the outside world. It is a reasonable opinion that they would not have made a European war. The conditions which invited an irresponsible bid for the gains of war were provided by the economic vicissitudes which three times on a great scale littered Germany with newly uprooted social elements. To these desperates was offered the unparalleled power of modern mass society under technocratic rule. These conditions, which were world-wide and disturbed society in almost every country, engulfed Germany. Contribute to this situation the vicious international politics for which other nations were responsible, and the essential causes of the war are seen to have been by no means all specifically German. The whole history of the matter is, of course, far more complicated than this. The important point is that responsibility shall not be identified with causation.

The fallacy of treating Germany as the simple cause of the war is not merely intellectual; it is a psychological mistake and a moral fault. If Germany is punished as a war-maker with the idea of teaching her that war does not pay, she is likely to learn best of all the lesson that it does not pay to lose a war, and to be attracted most by the idea of exchanging places with the present victors. If she is to be won to a genuine and decisive renunciation of war as an instrument of policy, there must be on our part a ready recognition of the complex causation of the war and

its qualification of German responsibility. In the present plight of Germany, with so much difficult salvage work on hand and primitive anxieties clouding the immediate future, any refinements of reasoning must seem remote and out of place; but searching reflection and active discussion are bound to go on this time as last, and to influence policy and form temper. Therefore, British public opinion must from the first be clear and consistent and find every opportunity of firm expression, so that it provides a steady and sane influence on the development of German self-judgment.

GERMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT. The study of disease does often throw light on the normal processes of the healthy organism, but no student could gain a sound knowledge of the body by studying only its diseases. Similarly, acquaintance with Nazi ideas is of use only to those who are familiar with German political thought in its best exemplars. Max Weber offers a fine and recent example of German political thinking. It would be difficult to find anywhere a more scrupulous or a better equipped thinker in the political field: he had vast and many-sided scholarship, a singularly pure and sincere conscience, a keen and manly mind, plenty of zestful contacts with all sorts and conditions of men, a profound grasp of contemporary affairs. What are the decisive characteristics of his thought, and what is the sum of his influence?

He was preoccupied with the problem of the increasing enslavement of the individual soul to the complex administrative machinery of the modern state. That is indeed one ominous aspect of the modern human problem. But for Weber the problem was aggravated by his characteristic German assumption that the state must be a fully centralized power-state, whose test is its effectiveness in foreign policy. It was this assumption which forced his sensitive conscience to accept two fundamentally different ethical conceptions: the ethics of sentiment (the Sermon on the Mount) and the ethics of responsibility. This dualism was necessary, he thought, because the believer in an absolute ethic cannot stand up to the ethical irrationality of the world. "He who enters politics concludes a pact with devilish powers, since it is a realm where alone power and violence are valid means; yet from good may come evil and from evil good. Who does not see this is politically a child." Nevertheless, the statesman must be responsible for all predictable consequences of his action. War is the ethical responsibility of the state authority and not of the private citizen, whose duty is obedience. Mindful of the lacuna which Bismarck's policy had left in German politics, Weber rated subtle and instructed politicians with a calling and a sense of responsibility far before principles or forms of government, which he regarded as mere techniques. Thus the objectivity of politics was to be safeguarded by the search for leaders and the means of producing leaders.

It is easy to see the dangerous tendencies in this type of political thinking, and tempting to say, This is latent Nazism: this is indeed the

sort of political thinking which Germany has made a menace to the world, and which must be eradicated. It is truer and wiser to say, Here is the tragic predicament of humanity organized in the sovereign state. So long as that premise is fixed, the accident of Germany's particular historical and geographical situation (so different from our own) will force her to draw the same conclusions. The difference which lies between Weber and Hitler (it is a world of difference) is in Weber's insistence on the moral responsibility of statesmen for their acts, to their people and to humanity. What else is there at bottom to mitigate the consequences of international anarchy than this ethics of responsibility? The conviction which must invade German political thought is that war in itself, in principle, has become an irresponsible policy. The atomic bomb has made that conclusion irresistible. But a world in which irresistible conclusions are a sufficient sanction and the ethics of responsibility a normal rule is a world in which mutual confidence prevails, and that is in sad disrepair. All other work fails unless it is restored.

COMING EVENTS. Public lecturers giving their diagnosis of the times usually decline the rôle of prophet, although they are often enough fairly certain in their own minds of what is going to happen: they do not commit themselves because they are well aware of the possibility which always remains that one of the factors will develop a difference that will make all the difference. Wisdom after the event is proverbially cheap, but wisdom before the event is not so scarce as to be a mere curiosity. Historical events do not happen overnight like unpredictable natural calamities. The bid for power of Macedon or of Germany, the French Revolution or the fall of the Roman Empire, showed themselves plainly long enough before they became fatalities; indeed, they had taken shape as literature even if they had not taken place as events. The danger can always be located: in a school of thought, a party, a policy, a man. But the fears of men derive from what has happened to them already and cloud their recognition of what is coming to them. It is a long step towards political maturity when this fatal attachment to the past is broken and a positive forward habit of locating new centres of danger is formed. Not that this is a royal road to political sagacity. For nobody who has not made up his mind about the kind of society he wants to see and the means of getting it is going anywhere in his political thinking whatever road he travels. And nobody who does not study the times will know the difference between significant action and mere antics. In short, there are no dangers at all unless there is something which is cherished. But given political hopes and aims, the expectation of new dangers and a readiness to locate them give a pretty sure foothold on the perilous hill of destiny.

FREEDOM'S OWN ISLAND. European nationals, especially perhaps those who were exiles in this country, had hoped and expected that the events of the war would bring Great Britain out of her semi-isolation

and merge her in Europe. For new weapons had shattered the illusion of island security and the sufficiency of naval supremacy. However, we are in real danger of emerging from the war more insular than ever. The remembrance of our own ordeal and the prospect of our own reconstruction, with which we are filled, are so different in character from the memories and prospects which fill the minds of the nationals of occupied Europe (think of the Yugo-Slavs) that the difference is a deeper division than anything we have known before. This difference, unless we are keenly aware of it, is likely to undermine our whole approach to European problems. As things return to something like normal the reality of the difference will be obscured, and all the more alienating. Nothing less than the closest and most widespread personal contacts and intercourse between British people and Europeans of all sorts will serve to minimize the danger of tragic misunderstandings which would stultify the part which we are bound to play in European affairs. The difference of situation which now divides us from Europe is not the same difference which the mere logic of weapons and strategy can abolish. The war which has brought that difference to an end has created this new moral difference. The same circumstances that have put us all in the same boat have made us more apt to get on each other's nerves.

EPILOGUE ON WAR? Until our own day the dictum that all's fair in love and war was always entirely disreputable. When war was an accepted instrument of public policy, essential to the free exercise of national sovereignty, and sex was an institution, both were closely and decently regulated to make them practicable social arrangements. The enlightenment of our day in abolishing the institutions repudiated the regulations. If war ceases to be an instrument of politics, the limited application of violence for the achievement of a limited object, and becomes unlawful, it runs to unlimited violence and cunning; it becomes again the brute struggle for survival, of which the only outcome can be total victory or unconditional surrender. We cast out the devil and he returns with seven others more evil than himself, and the last state becomes worse than the first. We renounced war as an instrument of policy and were forced to take to scientific annihilation as a means of survival. It is one of life's major ironies, but that aspect of the matter is more curious than important: the important thing is that the devils which possessed us and the rest of mankind have suddenly and dramatically taken their exit from the human stage. It might have happened otherwise. It might have been left to the powers collectively exercising military sanctions against an aggressor to furnish a last model of war as an instrument of policy, an application of force solely to induce the aggressor to call off his resort to force, without penalties. Such an evolution of the institution of war was deflected by the political mutations which produced illegitimate criminal governments with which there

could be no ordinary dealings; and war, missing its decorous consummation in the progress of civilization, after fulfilling the lurid phantasmagorias of the prophets, burned itself out with the atomic bomb.

THE GERMAN QUESTION

THE United Nations, in carrying the war to the point of unconditional surrender, undertook full responsibility for a definitive settlement of the German question, which has agitated the course of European politics for so long a time and can now be settled and secured by the masters of Europe without the inconvenience of German participation in the transaction. What precisely is the German question? Is it a question of frontiers with her neighbours (claims and counter-claims)? Is it the question of national unification, begun so late in European history? Is it the question of Germany's position and rôle in Europe and the world? Or is it simply the problem of persistent German aggression? If the German question is taken simply as the problem of how to deal with an aggressive power (for the question can now be taken much as the victors please), and solved by the national castration of Germany, then of course all other aspects of the question are thereby disposed of: German frontiers can be redrawn by her interested neighbours, and the extent and character of her unification becomes a matter of mere convenience; her place and part in European and world history then belongs to the past. If this is the justice of the mass democracies (and it is taking this shape), there was more equity and less hypocrisy in the old-fashioned dynastic politicians. However, the times are dark, savage, and tragic, for all the light of peace that has returned to the world, and nice justice cannot be looked for—there is only Nemesis.

Reconstruction in Europe has begun in practice with the looting of Germany: the wholesale, indiscriminate carrying off to Russia of the means of production and the means of transport; the mass expropriation and expulsion of Germans by Polish and Czech authorities. At the level of mere political pressure, American and British industrialists, talking of reparations and security, favour a policy of de-industrialization which will eliminate a powerful competitor and multiply their opportunities in the market. At the highest level, General de Gaulle sketches his vision of France and Britain as twin imperial world powers, maintained by mutual support, secured in Europe by a Western sphere of co-prosperity founded on the Ruhr and the Rhine.

It is stupid to be cynical about all this. Of course the victors are building up their national positions. Of course the spoils of war appear on the agenda before reparations and security properly so called. Responsible statesmanship moves slowly. The Potsdam decisions have provided some governing principles for the treatment of Germany. The United Nations Organization has provided a working instrument of world order and world collaboration. These are the beginnings of achievement. The Atlantic Charter did not change the world. Nevertheless, its prin-

ciples have taken root everywhere. Most ordinary people want, and expect, to see sensible international arrangements for the use of world resources for a common and shared prosperity. That is becoming the popular demand made of statesmanship, and popular governments are increasing. Urgent common problems, like the atomic bomb and the appalling and menacing plight of Europe, may make progress rapid and even spectacular. But it would be foolish to expect to see with the end of the war an end of the power policies of the Great Powers. Germany's bid for power has resulted in a fierce intensification of these policies. They are not likely to mean justice. They are not very likely, either, to mean war. There can be reasonable hope that there will be a gradual relaxation, a slow passage to a new normality; for we are not returning to the *status quo*. Meanwhile, the main thing is to avoid the more obvious blunders. The atomic bomb and the physical plight of Germany are typical problems, the symbolic problems of the new politics. They are international menacing problems, and in dealing with them and their like we shall make or mar the future.

THE DESTINY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

THE Christmas of 800 A.D. was the Founder's Day of our Western Civilization. On that day, at the Basilica of St. Peter's, Charlemagne, the Frankish barbarian, was crowned Emperor by the Pope. Charlemagne was the first of a new historic mintage—the Holy Roman Emperors of the German People. And it was not until 1806, after almost exactly a thousand years, that by the order of Napoleon the sovereigns of this mintage were withdrawn from circulation. Charlemagne's empire was the First Reich; the Hohenzollern empire, inaugurated at Versailles after the Prussian victories of 1870, was the Second Reich; and the Nazi empire that began in 1933 with the burning of the Reichstag, and ended in 1945 with the suicide of Hitler was the Third Reich.

By the ritual and circumstances of his coronation, Charlemagne, a Teutonic chieftain, was persuaded by the Pope that he was a successor of the Roman Caesars and of the Jewish Kings and a rival of the Greek Emperors of Byzantium. Charlemagne inaugurated the custom of living on cultural legacies—the legacies of Greece, of Rome, and Israel. A gentleman inherits money; a plebeian makes it. What is gentlemanly about Western civilization is the inherited part; what is vulgar is the built-up part. So at least our conservatives are always telling us. According to them, Western civilization is Europe, and Europe is the Catholic Faith and Roman Law and Greek philosophy; Europe is the Natural Law of the Stoics and the Divine Law of Revelation; Europe is Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas; Europe is the Feudal System and the Fixed Estates of gentlemanly landlords, learned clerics, and ignorant peasants.

But legacies, whether cultural or monetary, are ambiguous gifts; they may stimulate or paralyze; they may provide a capital for new ventures

or an income for unearned repose. Who in any case would want a legacy of old clothes? And have we not been told on high authority that we cannot pour new wine into old bottles? But metaphors apart, let us face the facts of history: the Teutonic Barbarians, Goths and Franks and Lombards, were confronted and intimidated by the most highly developed and matured of all the preceding civilizations—the Graeco-Roman. The Barbarians were involuntarily infected by feelings of profound inferiority when they became more intimate with the civilization which, physically, they had raped. And this civilization, when in its last phase, had accepted Christianity, itself a syncretism of the Hellenistic and Jewish views of life.

The rape of a lady by a brutal churl is an unfortunate beginning even for a marriage of convenience. Culture may have to submit to force, but the two will remain outwardly conjoined and inwardly divided. There will be no true marriage of hearts and minds; but co-habitation will be made tolerable by a strict separation of functions. The lady of this parable is the Graeco-Roman civilization; the churl is the Teutonic Barbarian. The separation of function is the division of powers between the spiritual and secular, the cultural and the material; between the “inner life” of feeling and imagination and the “outer life” of action and will. For the first time in history the cultural and material functions of civilization will organise themselves in two separate households. One of these households will specialise in religion and art, the other in politics and economics. In public the households will be polite, but in private they will be hostile, to one another. And then, as so often in the affairs of the unhappily married, the private war breaks out into a public scandal. So history presents us with the unprecedented spectacle of open conflict between church and state, pope and emperor, between holy clerks or clerics and unholy men of action and affairs. And the attorneys for the two sides frame-up their slogans: the spiritual has superior jurisdiction over the material; the eternal is superior to the temporal; or, alternatively, that the spiritual power is so ethereal in its ladylike and other world perfections that it must be curtained off in perpetual purdah, leaving the forum and the market place to the brutes of the masculine world.

The Teutonic barbarians who overran the Roman Empire were less fortunate than their cousins, the Hellenes and the Italians, who in an earlier *Voelkerwanderung* had conquered the Mycenaean and Etruscan peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean. The civilization of these peoples, though high, was not of such a character as to intimidate their conquerors. The conquerors acquired from them their techniques and technologies just as the Japanese in little more than half a century acquired the techniques and technologies of the West. The Hellenes and Italians learned how to farm and how to navigate, but in essentials they maintained their own religion, morals, and social organisation. They were not unduly impressed by the religion of the conquered. It was only at a much later

period, in the days of doubt and decadence, that the religion of the conquered became significant. It was then that Orpheus and Dionysius, with their ominous mystery of death and resurrection, could compete for attention with the optimistic assumptions of the cult of Zeus and Apollo. What the religions of the conquered peoples taught the new arrivals was the importance of not taking religion too seriously. Success in civilization was clearly more dependent on intelligently concerted action than on the dramatic rituals of priests and shamans. The Graeco-Roman civilization is the earliest instance in human history of a rationalistic outlook on the world. To Greeks and Romans the priest was a supernumerary on the stage of human affairs. What religion there was took the form of a civic celebration of the values of collective life. The festivals in honour of the city's gods gave the people an imaginative outlook on the naturalistic and historic bases of their civilization. The citizens were encouraged to have faith in the stability of a rationalistic society.

But what faith hoped for proved illusory. It was certainly true that no society that preceded the Graeco-Roman in time showed comparable achievements. For rationalism is a method—indeed the only method—of employing the human mind as an instrument for the intelligent control of the physical—and what was in those days even more important—the social environment. The Greeks and Romans were the first self-conscious practitioners of the social sciences. A civil service, a standing army, a code of law, a system of finance, if they are all of them to function in a large-scale multinational society, cannot be created by mere rule of thumb. The creators must be men of high intelligence and character, accustomed to the control of their emotions and able to distinguish between the worlds of phantasy and of fact. The faith in the perpetuity, or, at least, in the longevity of a rationalistic society need not have proved illusory. What caused the breakdown was not the rationalism, the science, and the intelligence, but the abuse of them by the ruling class. Social science when applied to government may be as efficient and as evil in the use of its efficiency, as chemical science can be when applied to the making of explosives and their use in war. A Roman proconsul, for instance, could squeeze an Oriental province far more efficiently than could its native rulers, and on his return as a millionaire nabob could corrupt his contemporaries far more virulently than could the example set by some soft-living and self-indulging scion of the ruling class.

Science is the blue-print of power. The older social sciences—politics, economics, jurisprudence, and the newer social sciences—group psychology, propaganda, public hygiene, are highly generalised critiques of the arts employed in managing human beings. In the older social sciences we have a great deal to learn from the men of Classical Antiquity. After all, they knew how to run a city-state, such as Athens was in its best days, with a high standard of life for several hundred thousand human beings; and they knew how to run a multinational society—the Roman Empire—with a population of sixty to eighty millions.

And they ran this world empire without the assistance of the telephone, the telegraph, the railway, the steamship, the typewriter, and the printed page. For these modern artefacts are the fruits of natural science applied to the human needs for communication, and in Classical Antiquity, the natural sciences—astronomy, physics, biology—were still at a rudimentary level. Greek geometry was the exception: it was free of the speculative guesses and unverified fancies that abound in the natural science of Aristotle. But Greek geometry was not applied by the Greeks to such a useful art as that of engineering. Geometry was an intellectual game played for the diversion—and in Platonism for the spiritual edification—of gentlemen and philosophers of leisure. Why use geometry in the construction of labour-saving machines when slave labour is plentiful? And slaves are plentiful because the social arts and sciences, operated by a managerial class of bosses and bureaucrats, has concentrated in its hands an overwhelming power which it uses to inflate its own standard of life at the expense of the peoples to whom the power is applied.

The problem which Classical Antiquity failed to solve—it is the problem torturing mankind to-day—is the problem of power. Pericles and Augustus Caesar, notable wielders of power in their day, conducted their political business over much smaller worlds than those engaging the attention of a Bismarck or an Adolf Hitler. But there is another difference and of much greater moment. Bismarck used the Prussian railways to help him defeat the Austrians and the French, and Hitler used the lethal chamber and the bombing aeroplane to help him exterminate the Jews and Poles. Railways, lethal chambers, and bombing aeroplanes are instances of natural science applied to war; and war is a method of destroying the power of an adversary to resist the enforcement of one's will. Pericles and Augustus Caesar depended on the social sciences of war and politics. Bismarck and Hitler, in their pursuit of power, knew how to exploit the natural as well as the social sciences.

Hitler's attempt at solving the power-problem of mankind followed the lines of a new Caesarism. Hitler had learned from Alfred Rosenberg, his instructor in the philosophy of history, that the classical Caesarism failed, first, because it was of Mediterranean and not of global dimensions, and secondly, because the Romans had mixed their blood with that of the peoples they had subjected. If these two errors were rectified, Caesarism must succeed. So that an empire of global dimensions, run by pure-blooded Germans and disposing of the new social sciences of propaganda and psychology and of the new sciences of oil and radiation, would achieve a complete control of the human race. There would be only two classes—slave owners and slaves. The Third Reich would be a stable society and would last for at least a thousand years.

The new Caesarism, like the old, has failed; and it has failed not because of its unreason but because of its inhumanity. Every civilization is a pattern of human living; and at every turning-point of history

there is a choice of patterns. Freedom of choice is restricted by geography and by the deposit of artefacts and institutions left by earlier forms of civilization. But Caesarism fails because the Caesars, in aspiring to be gods, succeed only in being beasts—and not even beasts, for beasts are innocent in their creatureliness. There is something fatal about the possession of absolute power. Ancient Caesars and modern Caesars alike succumb because of the dropsical swellings of their lusts, the pernicious anaemia of their hearts and because of the cataracts that blot out their eyes.

What other solutions are there of the Problem of Power? Caesarism is a form of Totalitarianism: it places all power, spiritual as well as material, in the hands of Caesar, who is Pontifex Maximus, and Censor Morum as well as Princeps and Imperator. With the Fall of Rome the time had come for trying out a new solution. There was to be a division of power. The pope as supreme pontiff was to be the authority for inner culture, and the German emperor the authority for external action. This type of dualism has been discussed at the beginning of this essay. From Charlemagne to Luther and throughout the medieval period Dualism prevailed. And Dualism in turn broke down. Pope and emperor failed to agree. And there was no third authority to arbitrate between them. In theory the good European owed allegiance to them both. In theory he could be divided into an intraverted and purely spiritual self and into an extraverted and purely practical self, the first obeying the Pope and the second the Emperor. But is it really possible for a human being to divide himself into two Adams, the one a mystical monk thinking only of eternal life and the other a full-blooded animal thinking of sex and sustenance and status?

The Pope won his war with the Emperor, and the consequences for Europe and for Germany were disastrous. Caesarism reappeared in the debilitated form of Caesaro-Papalism. And while England, France and Spain developed into strong nation states under absolute monarchs, Germany was left with a chaos of several hundred feudal lordlings unrestrained by law or by a feeling of responsibility for their exploited subjects. And a further consequence of Caesaro-Papalism was the advent of Luther. Luther, with a typical German love of extremes, reaffirmed in its most extravagant form the principle of the separation of powers. In things spiritual every Christian man has perfect liberty, but in things temporal the Christian man has no liberty at all. The Christian finds his true self and his salvation by faith in Christ; but over against the lure of his natural and bodily self the works of civilization are vain. Lust, the bastard offspring of Original Sin, can only be restrained by keeping the Big Stick—the india-rubber truncheon is the Nazi equivalent—in the hands of the absolutist prince. And so, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the German people had spiritual liberty in abundance but scarcely the rudiments of political and social liberty. During these last two centuries the Germans have produced an extraordinarily

fine crop of poets, philosophers, theologians, historians, and scientists, all free to be "Higher Critics" of Christianity, and all free so to undermine its moral authority that Hitler in his dosshouse in Vienna and all the other little Hitlers everywhere knew perfectly well that the educated classes no longer believed in, or had any respect for, Christianity. One useful piece of debunking the Nazis have to their credit: they have shown conclusively that the medieval doctrine of the separation of powers, as interpreted by Luther in Germany, or by General Franco in Spain, or by the late Doctor Dollfuss in Austria, is a mask for tyranny.

As neither princes nor priest can be entrusted with power, why not dispense with, or at least minimise, every form of institutional authority? This is the solution which recommended itself to individualists, anarchists, laissez-faire liberals and bourgeois capitalists, artists, scientists and intellectuals. For more than two centuries, from 1688 to 1914, this solution was generally adopted by the Anglo-Saxon world and by those countries that were influenced by its example.

Individualism is a good working doctrine for pioneers. Churches and governments were almost inaudible when civilization was marching from New York to California and from London to every quarter of the globe. The primacy of the spiritual was being challenged by the primacy of the deed. Power was passing to a new human type to whom the management of nature was more important than the management of men. These pioneers recovered something of the zest of the earliest civilizations when the swamps of the Nile Valley were being drained and irrigation channels were making available the fertilising waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. The curse was being removed from labour when labour no longer meant subjection to a feudal chief.

But individualism is not enough. The pioneers want freedom to make their individual contribution to civilization. But the children of the pioneers readily degenerate into rentiers who want freedom to sponge upon civilization but never to increase it. And the spongers fancy themselves as connoisseurs. Hitler discovered that by playing on the fear these spongers and connoisseurs felt of losing their unearned incomes he could enlist them in his fifth column.

Power is not an end in itself. What mankind wants is power to make a new world order, a new pattern of world civilization. Every civilization is an historic experiment in human living. And the object of a philosophy of history is to make a critical appraisal of such experiments. It has been said that ever since Fichte addressed the German people after the defeat at Jena, every educated German has dabbled in the philosophy of history. When we remember Germany's outstanding position in the world both in 1914 and in 1939, it is hard to believe that economic motives determined the German will to war. All the evidence shows rather that the will to war derived its inspiration from an interpretation of history. It is from history that the Germans derive their *Weltanschauung*, their view of the world. The view they took of themselves, of their past, and of their future was decisive.

History, the Germans say, is the Assize Court at which judgment is delivered upon mankind. The events of 1945 are a judgment against which there is no appeal; and if the Germans have not completely lost their capacity for historical thinking, they will agree.

The new Caesarism will be the Caesarism of mankind and therefore no Caesarism. The Nazi pretension that civilization is exclusively Aryan or German has been exploded and by the Germans themselves. The new Individualism will become universal and therefore moral. The Anglo-Saxon pioneers who practised the older individualism thought more of making their own fortunes than the fortune of mankind. But the frontiers of civilization have travelled eastwards to Russia and Siberia and westwards over the Pacific Ocean to China and India and the Near East. East is West and West is East. The Slavs and the Chinese are amongst the frontiersmen and pioneers of civilization.

And when the last Caesar will have vanished, so will the last Pope. Man is not everywhere and always an unhappy duality of corrupted flesh and aborted soul. Man is under no compulsion to surrender his authority to a dual dictatorship, one of the spirit and one of the body. The German people have not found their salvation in Christian dualism, neither in that of Charlemagne nor in that of Luther. Still less have they found salvation in the pagan dualism of Hitler with its separation of mankind into herrenvolk and slaves. But the German people will find salvation if they see themselves as an equal, but not as a superior, nation, among the United Nations of Mankind.

JOHN KATZ.

GERMANY 1929-33

THE object of this article is to recall the Germany which was engulfed by Nazism and the process of its engulfment. That process began with the crash of the New York Stock Exchange in 1929, but the complex life of the Weimar Republic continued until Hitler dominated it during 1933. If we are concerned with the question of responsibility for the rise of the Nazis to a dominating position, then we must study this period. If we are concerned with the emergence of a new leadership and a different national mentality in Germany with which co-operation will be possible, then we must comprehend something of the inter-war years, for the experience of those years will be alive in the minds of all over 35 from whom anti-Nazi leadership may come.

Paul Viénot, in his book "Uncertain Germany," written in 1931 to present the real Germany to the French, urged that the German problem should be seen as Germany herself saw it, that is, from the point of view of that "crisis of bourgeois civilization and culture," of which she herself was so ceaselessly aware and with which she was so profoundly concerned. He pointed out that it was not very difficult for a foreigner to discover what Germany thought about herself, how she saw her own problems, because more than any other country she watched herself

with an almost pathological impulse to self-analysis. She was in a state of hyperconsciousness in which everyone was waiting to see what new form of society, what new guiding values were about to emerge. The revolution had established a democratic parliamentary constitution, but it had not solved the social conflict over economic organization and the resulting social structure. It is a mistake to think of Germany as having simply been inapt at democratic government, for more important than her lack of democratic tradition was the violence of the economic and social crisis which confronted the new democracy, and which we ourselves have not yet surmounted.

Paul Viénot emphasized the relativism which pervaded all thought in Germany. The Marxian conception of culture and morality as a superstructure conditioned by varying methods of economic production and social organization was by no means confined to the Marxian socialists, but slipped into the consciousness and thought of the whole nation, which tended with unusual consistency to see itself as in an historic phase whose values had no absolute worth. But two tendencies should be distinguished within this historical outlook. It made conviction and valuational judgment almost impossible. Equally, it was the environment of revolutionary fervour. Both the Marxian working classes and the people deeply touched by the Jugendbewegung were really waiting for the emergence of a new social life, and were waiting in a mood of prophetic fervour, seeing in a glass darkly what would become as plain as day.

This relativism and instability profoundly influenced the great educational reforms and experiments which spread throughout Germany during the Weimar Republic. After visiting many of the leading centres of Adult Education in the autumn of 1931, I myself wrote: "In England we are rightly aware of living in a period of transition, but in Germany awareness of penetrating change is vivid and ceaseless to a point almost unimaginable here. War, defeat, revolution, and inflation seem to have driven home to everyone the instability of all things, so that theories of change and historic sequence make an easy appeal to the mind of every section of the nation. People who are active in any direction hang on the future, and this not only politically and economically; in art and in ethics, in the simple forms of daily life they ask what trends of to-day will be significant to-morrow. One gets the impression that every year since the war has seen the passing of new styles, new hopes, new convictions, and the irreparable fault is to get left behind. The two phrases which one cannot escape are the need for a new 'Lebensform' (Life-form) and the nerve-racking effect of the present 'Zersplitterung' (disunity). To understand the present and find one's bearings for the future is seen by the leading educationalists as so urgent that history, literature, science, all become subsidiary in the educational process. It is in this tense atmosphere that Volksbildung has developed since the war."

It was not only in adult education that this consciousness of "crisis" conditioned education. Lichtwark, the outstanding pioneer of a more

vital secondary education in Hamburg, wrote that in his school they wished "to make the younger generation aware, in case they do not already feel it plainly themselves, that it is no longer their lot to go forth on beautiful avenues made smooth by their elders and on roads leading to established values"—they must be prepared to meet new conditions and react to untried situations. Bondy, who founded a private school in the Harz mountains, shared this mentality in extreme but symptomatic form. According to the pamphlet on German Experimental Schools recently published over here,* "he asked himself what use it was educating children for community life when all the old structures, such as the family, the churches, and the nation, were toppling. Where could the German idealism of the 19th century with its ideals of justice and freedom possibly be used? He hoped to set free deeply buried forces through consciousness of religious power. Freed from dogmatism and rationalism, youth should feel itself embedded in a broader entity; it would thus, he hoped, discover *new values*."

Thus intellectual relativism brought forth a vague, non-rational, religious expectancy. It was hoped that somehow an effectively creative faith in a new scheme of values and way of life would come upon them; it would well up from a life in contact with nature, or emerge out of experience of a complete group-life. Individualism was part of the disintegrating bourgeois society. And yet in the midst of chaos and doubt the individual needed tremendous courage and personal integrity—that was fully recognized. In seeking a satisfying group-life the individual would learn how to shape his own. Group-life in the country was a dominant theme in the new educational movement, whether it took the form of each school acquiring for itself a country home, or of long school tours in the country. It is the theme of the Jugendbewegung and permeated educational thought.

It is comprehensible that against this background of uncertainty and expectancy the appeal made by Nazi leaders in their speeches to youth might come with startling force. We are accustomed to say that Germans like to obey and to be told what to do, but one must have some conception of the social mentality of the last years of the Weimar Republic to realize the burden of uncharted navigation which the young were asked to prepare for and to shoulder. And this not only in culture and ethics, but against the background of economic collapse and political deadlock. Then came the Nazi leaders with speeches such as those quoted by Amy Buller in her book "Darkness Over Germany." "I give you now something completely true, I give you also a way of life. This truth must be preserved and we will have no mercy on any who try to interfere with it. *The age of uncertainty is over for you.*" Again, "I give you something eternal. No more experiments, no more disappointments." Or this, "You are no longer alone. You will gain your strength

*Experimental Schools in Germany. By Minna Specht and Alfons Rosenberg. German Educational Reconstruction, 1/6.

in this fellowship as you help to build the nation." It is almost surprising that the Hitler Jugend had only 30,000 members when Hitler became Chancellor, whereas there were five million members of other youth groups when he suppressed them, and five million young people outside all organizations.

It is important that we should appreciate the extent and the quality of the educational reforms in the Weimar Republic, for more than anything else they revealed and expressed the democratic capacity, vitality, and intention of the nation. An excellent account of them is given by Alexander and Parker in their book "The New Education in the German Republic," published in 1928, before poverty had contracted new developments and political tension had overshadowed all. The elementary schools were chiefly affected, and a whole new system of training teachers for elementary schools was established in Prussia, where fifteen new "Pedagogische Akademien" had been set up before the slump cut the policy short. In some of the other States the training of elementary teachers was integrated with other studies in the universities. Great individual initiative was shown all over the country, as soon as the former stringent control was relaxed. The teachers inaugurated new methods and a new free and democratic spirit in their schools, and were backed up by local and State authorities. In many localities the teachers called in the co-operation of the parents and made the schools real community centres. The educational trend was akin to contemporary movements in other countries: to fit education to the nature of children, to work from points of real interest to the child, to keep the child's active, spontaneous co-operation throughout, to give greater freedom and to ask for more responsible and understanding partnership from the children in all spheres of school life, to build up community feeling in which teachers, children, and parents are united. But in Germany this movement came about with a unique élan as part of the reshaping of a democratic nation. Writing of the community schools in Hamburg, Alfons Rosenberg says: "In these Hamburg teachers, coming, for the most part, from the Socialist Youth Movement, a great love had arisen. Love for the child, love for life with and for youth, love for the working class and its future, and love for a Germany, democratic, socialistic, and peaceful, who should become a good sister to all the other nations." Expressive of the mood in which the school experiments were undertaken in the first years after the war is the discouraged remark of one of the leaders in 1924: "For a long time, in any attempt at further development, we had felt we were no longer a cell of *the becoming*, but an alien body in a stagnant organism." In adult education, too, remarkable individual initiative was shown and voluntary bodies grew rapidly to develop work which was supported by trade unions and local and State authorities. Freedom and variety and vigour abounded, along with the ardent desire that the Volkshochschule might truly play their part as formative "cells of the

becoming." But all the splendid educational work of the Weimar Republic became so many "alien bodies" in the Nazi body politic.

The search for new values, the education of the nation, all was overtaken by the swift political developments which set in with the economic collapse in the summer of 1929. It was, of course, this political situation which in part conditioned the whole mentality of the nation. During the prosperous period between 1924-28 a certain sense of stability had begun to show itself. But with the slump this was at once felt to have been illusory, and the mood of the revolution and inflation period returned, only with less hopefulness and more disillusionment and desperation. This mood in turn affected the political situation, the growth of Hitlerism, Communism, and the ruthless determination of the capitalist clique to exercise power over a nation ready for change.

In 1928 a coalition government with Stresemann as Foreign Minister had been founded upon the support of the Social Democratic Party, the moderate middle-class Volkspartei, and the Catholic Centre Party; the last troops soon left the Rhineland, and Germany seemed prosperous as a result of American loans. Before the end of 1929 the slump had spread so rapidly throughout Germany that the yield of taxation was inadequate to carry on the government without stringent economy. Stresemann won a compromise between the socialist and capitalist sections of his coalition over the reduction of unemployment pay, and died that night of apoplexy. Upon the S.P.D. then fell the full responsibility of its numerical preponderance in the coalition, but its policy was blocked and its authority shattered by Schacht's refusal to grant the Government a loan except on terms of more severe economy. After this the coalition broke up over the question of reducing unemployment pay, and Hindenburg appointed Brüning to force through a policy of social economy, wage-cutting, and salary-cutting which was desired by the industrialists who were supported by the Reichswehr. The existence of this intensely "ruling class," conservative army was a decisive factor in the political situation. The Republic had allowed its army to be built up by officers of the old Imperial Army, which was an understandable but disastrous mistake. Hindenburg backed up Brüning in the use of emergency decrees, since the Reichstag could not be expected to pass his measures. Despite this, a motion for the withdrawal of the decrees was passed, and as a result the Reichstag was dissolved.

The following election, on September 30th, 1930, revealed the swift growth since 1928 of the Hitler vote from 800,000 to 6,500,000. Misery resulting from economic depression had brought four million more voters to the poll, three million of whom were estimated to have voted for Hitler, and two and a half million deserted various Right-wing parties to follow him. The Marxians lost only half a million of their fourteen million votes to Hitler. I was present in the autumn of 1931 at a discussion in a Volkschulheim between industrial workers and white

collar workers (Angestellte) as to why the Angestellte and other middle-class groups did not turn socialist when faced with ruin, but responded instead to Nazi propaganda. The answer was that unlike the proletariat who were habitually revolting against capitalist society, they felt that it was defeat and Versailles which had shattered their security and comfort, and they wished for the return of the former prosperity and greatness of the nation in which they had been content. They aspired to middle class manners and culture and shrank from proletarianisation. Hitler, not Marx, seemed to diagnose their troubles. National revival, not class war, appealed to them. So the Nazi party grew and had to be reckoned with.

The Social Democratic Party again supported Brüning for fear of driving him into the arms of the Nazis in search of a majority, for he had only 200 seats, the Nazis 150, and the S.P.D. 220. The only alternative course would have been some kind of revolutionary seizure of power in the face of the constitutional authority of Hindenburg, who supported the powerful landowners and industrialists, who were also backed by the Reichswehr. But the S.P.D. was essentially a democratic party and wedded to the Republic and unprepared for the existing situation in which force was rapidly becoming the decisive factor.

During 1931 there were six million unemployed and the Nazi party was growing and likewise the Communist party. Street fighting was the order of the day and the papers published lists of casualties. The idea of economic "autarchy" became widespread as export trade became more and more difficult, and with it came the desire for a larger economic unit, more "Lebensraum," just as Imperial preference gained support at this time in England. But an attempted customs union with Austria was vetoed at Geneva by France, an incident which drove home the fact of national impotence to all Germans and did much to increase disgust with the League of Nations and to rouse the desire for rearmament, thus increasing the response to Hitler's propaganda.

By 1932 the restrained policy of Brüning no longer satisfied the capitalists and landlords, who began to want more drastic measures, more like those advocated by Hitler and Hugenberg, including the suppression of trade unions and all Marxian organizations, as well as open rearmament, which would, incidentally, employ the coal and steel industries. They secured the appointment of von Papen by Hindenburg to supersede Brüning. At once he dismissed the Social Democratic Government of Prussia by threatening to use the Reichswehr; and he then dismissed the Reichstag. At the following election in July, Hitler polled fourteen million votes out of a total of thirty-seven million. The revolutionary mood of desperate people could hardly find satisfaction in the acquiescent Social Democratic Party. But the Communists were also growing in number, though weak in leadership. Hitler had at that time a strong left wing, and it is curious that the capitalists had come more and more to look upon him as an ally; but he refused to enter a coalition with

Papen unless he himself were Chancellor. Papen, fearing that Hitler might gain a majority by uniting with the Centre, again dissolved the Reichstag and declared a state of emergency, which did produce quiet in the streets; and this check reduced the Nazi vote by two million at the next election. In the new Reichstag, however, nine-tenths of the members were opposed to Papen.

It is notable that the capitalist and military dictatorship was not prepared to continue to govern without popular support, and therefore the fatal step was taken. In January, 1933, after the Schleicher interlude, Hindenburg made Hitler Chancellor with two other Nazi ministers in an otherwise Nationalist Government. Rauschning has explained how the "conservatives" thought they could gain the support of the Nazi movement whilst keeping control in their own hands. There was full agreement between "conservatives" and the Nazis on the need for rearmament and a policy of national self-assertion and on the suppression of the Marxian opposition. According to Rauschning, however, the upper-class nationalists did not envisage total mobilization for war nor unlimited aggression, nor the unrestrained brutality and the destruction of culture. But the brutal and fanatical party took control once Hitler was Chancellor, and the last attempt to oppose him came from his own left wing, which had really stood for a socialist, though national, policy. The murder of all left-wing leaders in June, 1934, showed the German people that effective revolt had become impossible against the highly organized "Party" which had joined with the industrialists and Reichswehr.

We shall now discover how much silent and secret opposition to Nazism has survived twelve years of propaganda and terrorism, and of what nature it is. From many sources comes evidence that people and traditions are still alive to help to mould the future. These must be approached with respectful comprehension of the past experience in which they are rooted.

VIRGINIA FLEMMING.

GERMANY'S POLITICAL FUTURE

When the first British bombers went over to Berlin at the beginning of the war and dropped not bombs but leaflets, asking the German people to overthrow Hitler, many people believed that an anti-fascist war in the true sense of the word had begun. The dividing line between the fronts went right through all the nations. "The other Germany," the enemies of Hitler from within, were appealed to as a force which was to help in the winning of the war. Six years later the war ended through purely military defeat from without, and, although the B.B.C. propaganda went on to the last day to send out appeals to the German people, victory was won without any measurable contribution by the Germans.

Throughout the whole war the general nature of almost all these appeals betrayed a lack of understanding of the difficulties facing the isolated and terrorised forces of opposition under a well organised and

ruthless modern dictatorship. Without very much more concrete help the German anti-fascist resisters' struggle was doomed to failure. Of all the underground movements—except the Italians—they were in the least favourable position, because their forces had been split up and annihilated longest, and thus most successfully. Moreover, they had to fight for the defeat of their own country, whilst the resistance movements elsewhere were fighting a foreign invader; and in addition they did not know what would come after defeat. It has been the unanimous opinion of all progressive people in the democratic countries that the lack of positive Allied war aims was largely responsible for the weakness of the opposition in Germany. Lack of support from abroad at the early stage of the Nazi régime was another important factor.

Perhaps, if the facts about the terror in the concentration camps had been broadcast as widely then as after the conquest of Germany by the Allies, there would have been a truer estimation of the difficulties facing the "Other Germany." Because there was no evidence of widespread organised resistance, doubts could arise amongst a largely uninformed public whether there was such a Germany at all. This feeling rather than Vansittartism, in the sense in which this term has come to stand for a condemnation of the whole German people, became prevalent. The readers of this journal probably belong to the small section of the public which kept an informed and balanced attitude to this question. Since it still plays an important part in the arguments about the treatment of Germany now, some facts may be quoted, taken from as competent a source as the German Gestapo. The following figures show arrests made in April, May and June, 1944. All those arrested were Germans:

	April	May	June
Marxists and Communists ...	481	630	613
Catholics	29	5	7
Protestant Church	5	5	5
Jews	316	239	385
Reactionary Opposition	294	321	399
Resistance	493	Statistical sub-divisions were altered.	
Obstinacy	1,037	1,204	1,585
Strike Action	2,047	2,159	2,280

In January, February and March the figures for workers arrested because of strike action were 2,060, 2,085 and 2,294, respectively, again only Germans.

Thus, after eleven years of fascist hell there was still the will to resist among many German workers. The survey of several months gives a picture not of a special wave of arrests but of the average activity of the opposition.*

* From an article by Willi Eichler, "The End of the Nazi Regime," in *Socialist Commentary*, June, 1945.

After liberation, anti-fascist committees were founded, and attempts to reorganise the old Left movements made at once in many places. The Manifesto of a group of German prisoners in Buchenwald, a programme of action on democratic socialist lines, was one of the most striking documents to prove the indomitable spirit of the underground fighters. It was unfortunately not given the publicity which the atrocities of the camps received, although in this instance Brill, the leading Social Democrat connected with this activity, was appointed Minister President of Thuringia by the then British occupation authorities.

Another fact which was noticed with a surprise betraying the same ignorance as had characterised most Allied appeals to the German people to revolt against totalitarian dictatorship, was the completeness of the collapse once defeat was there. This was not the deliberate behaviour of people who wanted to curry favour with the occupying armies, but the genuine feeling amongst a large majority of the people that *liberation* from an intolerable tyranny had come to them as to other countries.

These two factors constitute the main hope that a democratic and peaceful Germany may arise, viz.: the existence of this section, however small, that remained not only loyal but active in pursuit of its ideals, and the preparedness of the overwhelming number of the unpolitical people to leave behind for ever the nightmare of the Nazis. The question, however, is: What are the chances which in the coming period will allow the progressive forces to reassert themselves and shape a better Germany? It is important not to underestimate their difficulties, and thus perhaps fail again to support them in time. Lack of success and lack of support quickly leads to frustration and disillusionment.

It has been a thesis of Left-wing movements that defeat in war offers the best if not the only chance for deep social changes within a nation. In the case of Germany this chance has been lost, at least for the immediate future. The military, political and international situation was not favourable, nor was there a sufficient organisation ready to act. The best we can hope for now is a period in which the forces of progress can renew themselves by coping with some of the urgent problems confronting the reconstruction of Germany.

The economic and political collapse of Germany has been so complete and the effects of war so disastrous that even occupying authorities with well prepared plans and a unified strategy would have had the utmost difficulties in their work of control and reconstruction. As we know, there was no constructive plan and there was no agreement amongst the Allies as to the future of Germany. The removal of large parts of German industrial equipment, including whole factories, to Russia; the loss of large parts of Germany in the East; the expulsion of between eight and eleven million who are now being driven into the already densely populated parts; the lack of any measure to get productive activity going as quickly as possible: all this has led us to a situation now when mass starvation, epidemics, and chaos are impending. The problems which arise from this situation cannot be tackled locally,

yet local activity, usually in complete isolation from other parts of Germany, is the only sphere open to German progressive forces. Though they are no longer isolated by Nazi terror, they are isolated by the lack of communications, the separation of families, comrades and work colleagues in the different zones, and by the daily struggle for obtaining the bare necessities of life which leaves hardly any energies free.

There is no certainty about the political framework upon which under Allied occupation and control national policies can be based. It is not certain, for example, whether further annexations will follow, or whether any return to unified economic, political and cultural life even in the remainder of Germany can be expected.

Dependence on the Allied Powers in itself would be a great obstacle to the revival of genuine democratic movements, however much they were welcomed in the first instance as liberators; but this difficulty could be coped with if it were not for the conflicts between the various occupying powers which are coming out now more and more into the open. The German people are finding out that, after all, the Nazi propaganda on this issue was not all lies. It is these conflicts, rather than any deliberate policy directed against the German people or born from reactionary designs, which obstruct a positive solution of the problems facing Germany, and, for that matter, Europe. The country is split up, not so much because it could otherwise not be prevented from becoming again aggressive (after all Allied power is supreme and the collapse in Germany is so complete that this time all safeguards against rearmament could be taken without any difficulty), but because the Allies cannot agree.

This division does not only split the country but the progressive forces themselves, whose unity would be so essential for the new Germany. Russia has her supporters and agents in every other part of Germany. The other Powers, knowing that these influences can at any moment be switched against them to embarrass, obstruct, or even actively oppose them, are inclined to be over-suspicious of all Left movements, and thus deny themselves very often the support of genuine progressive elements, and therefore fall back on the old reactionary forces, even if this was not their intention in the first instance.

There are further difficulties which are inherent in the inner weakness of the German democratic forces. It has become clear already that amongst the older generation the lessons of the failure of the Weimar Republic have not been learnt sufficiently to prevent a repetition. The new generation has grown up in an atmosphere of total corruption and intellectual starvation. It has not had time to produce new leadership, although even amongst them a considerable number has not become Nazified and many have been amongst passive and active resisters. The general ignorance about world developments, and especially about world opinion on Germany, is tremendous. From what one hears, only a very small number are yet facing up to the full implications of what Hitler and his policy have done to Germany, and how they have jeopardised her future relations with the rest of the world. The education which is

needed to further this understanding, without which nationalism neither in Germany nor amongst her neighbours can be overcome, is a long term task. Though people from outside Germany can and should help in it, in the first instance it must be undertaken by the progressive and internationally minded Germans themselves.

In the re-establishment of the freedom to form trade unions and political parties, the first step has now been taken to create centres for such reorientation and re-education, as well as for the building up of new democratic machinery. Yet these new freedoms, quite apart from the difficulties mentioned before, will not become a reality in any of the occupied zones, unless certain conditions are fulfilled which depend on Allied policy.

The main conditions are, firstly, that economic life is once more started, that consumers' goods are produced to satisfy the most urgent needs of the people and give them work which has a sense; secondly, a much more radical eradication of Nazis and Nazi helpers from influential posts is necessary. A typical remark made in letters from many German anti-fascists a few weeks after liberation, and even recently, was that "the anti-Nazis were disappointed, but the Nazis were pleasantly surprised" about the policy of the Allies. It is indeed strange that, on the one hand, the workers in the factories who demand the dismissal of notorious Nazis are often rebuked because such demands are said to endanger order and continuity in administration, whilst, on the other hand, when they want an extension of their trade union and political freedom they are told that they cannot be trusted to keep the Nazis out.

Without the hope that their efforts to destroy Nazism and militarism in Germany will be supported, or at least tolerated, the anti-fascist Germans will look to the future with very great pessimism. Their full contribution towards building a better Germany cannot be expected unless they see a hope that beyond the destruction of Nazism and imperialism there will be a Europe in which Germany can live too. This hope can at best only be small for realists amongst the Germans, as amongst other Europeans. But complete despair must be resisted, and the fact that in Britain a Labour Government has come to power has done a great deal to revive hopes.

If at least the zone under British control is administered with efficiency and in spite of all the necessary strictness in control and supervision to which everybody submits as a matter of fact, offers the Germans the prospect of a just and fair deal, there would be a point from which a start for the better can be made. Of course, much more is needed to deal with the urgent problems of the coming winter. The emergency measures required to fight pestilence and mass starvation are the joint responsibility of *all* the occupying powers, who will neglect them at their own peril.

The Labour Government can be trusted to have no love for the old reactionary forces which were restored in Germany with Allied help after the last war. It must be hoped that it will summon the courage (to be found, no doubt, in considerable strength in military places) to remove the

obstacles which have so far prevented a consistent encouragement of reliable progressive elements in Germany. The political refugees who desire to return, and who could give invaluable help in Germany now, should be allowed to go back without further delay. The British Labour Movement itself can help in the rebuilding of Germany through taking up contact again with its counterpart in Germany now in process of being revived. It is important that the T.U.C. has been asked to send a delegation which is to advise the re-founded trade union movement in Germany. Further contacts amongst many other sections of the population of both countries will follow. They can become a valuable factor in getting to know the truth about that "other Germany," which never went down completely under the Nazi terror, and which will now in almost equally difficult conditions need all the support its friends can give

MARY SARAN

BOOK REVIEWS

DER FUEHRER. By Konrad Heiden. Gollancz, 10/6.

Konrad Heiden's book is a detailed and penetrating study of a personality. More than that, it is a portrait of a people, and of a period. A picture of the kind of man Hitler actually was, like the picture of any other individual human being, has a certain social-documentary value. But a study of the man and his background, and of the factors which led to this particular human being dominating, first, his own immediate background and then a whole continent, is a matter of much greater importance.

Of much more *practical* importance, too. For Heiden's book helps us to answer more exactly the question which lies at the root of the most pressing problems confronting us to-day: the question, *Are the Germans Different?* To that question our prejudices, our pride, our carefully-nursed wartime emotions all answer "Yes." But it is extremely doubtful whether the historian of a century hence will observe any marked qualitative difference between the various European national ideologies of the 20th century, or between the characteristics of the masses in every country nurtured on those ideologies.

In his recent Conway Memorial lecture on "Truth and the Public," Mr. Kingsley Martin set himself to define and describe the "mass mind" of to-day; that "mind" which is at once the inspiration and the target and to a large extent the creation of the popular press. The great mass of men, he reminds us, 'live by loyalties, tradition and experience, not by logic and argument.' Further, in modern industrialised states, where the older local communities and associations have been broken up, society has become "a vast amorphous concentration of illiterate, unrelated individuals." Again (and remember, Mr. Martin is speaking primarily of Britain, not Germany)—"Comparatively few people have a passion for truth as a principle, or care about public events continuously when these do not obviously affect their own lives." All of us live "in a world far

too great for us to imagine and far too complex for us to understand." (Is it not true that, confronted by the terrific possibilities of the atomic bomb, most of us, in the *New Statesman's* words, perforce "shrug our shoulders helplessly and line up for cigarettes"?) Public opinion, even in a "democracy," is inevitably "fluctuating, vague and highly emotional." It yearns for Authority to tell it just how and where things have gone wrong. Most of all it yearns for the Voice of Authority in times of crisis; and is duly comforted and uplifted by a Prime Minister's broadcasts.

But this British mass-mind described by Mr. Martin—the product of partial literacy and half-baked education—is a phenomenon common to the whole 20th century industrial European scene. As Heiden puts it, one need only "look behind the revolving wheels and the striking pistons to sense the profound helplessness and inertia of the human society." The more intense the crisis, the more marked is the helplessness and the emotionalism of the mass—and the louder its demand that Authority tell it what to do, and whom to hit; for in hitting somebody or something it finds its greatest relief. So the Voice of Authority in Britain snarled "Na-a-zis," just as in Germany it shrieked "Jews," or in Russia "Hitlerite dogs."

In Germany the leaders did not need to wait for war to provide the crisis. Read Heiden's story of Germany during the 1920's, and of the successive crises which destroyed first property and then the very hope of work and livelihood; think of the mass of Germans as being much of a muchness with the people described by Kingsley Martin; and then ask yourself whether there was anything particularly mysterious, or peculiarly German, about the rise to power of such a man as Hitler. For, as Heiden says, Hitler did not so much conquer the masses as portray and represent them:—

His speeches are day-dreams of the mass soul . . . They begin always with deep pessimism and end in overjoyed redemption . . . Often they can be refuted by reason, but they follow the far mightier logic of the subconscious, which no refutation can touch. Hitler gave speech to the speechless terror of the modern mass, and to the nameless fear he has given a name.

Was he then, except maybe in courage and will-power, so very different from some of our own press-lords? And, if it had faced the same unending series of social upheavals, would not the nameless fear of the British, or any other, masses have been much like the German?

To base our future treatment of the German people on the idea of "punishment" is to demonstrate our own illiteracy in human affairs. The Blimps who can conceive of no other policy are to-day unfortunately reinforced by too many intellectuals, anxious to display that "toughness" which at the moment is so intellectually *chic*. The problem of re-educating Germany is not separate and distinct from the wider problem of educating ourselves and the rest of humanity in the elementary facts about the world we live in. Nor will it, any more than the

wider problem, be solved by ideological means alone. Its solution will depend on the provision of security, economic and political; a security which cannot be guaranteed except by international solidarity made manifest in actual international co-operation, on a basis of equality and brotherhood. In that spirit, and in that spirit alone, shall we be proved ultimately Realists.

"The pale, pathetic peoples still plod on
Through hoodwinkings to light"

J. F. HORRABIN.

MARTIN LUTHER, HITLER'S SPIRITUAL ANCESTOR. By Peter F. Wiener. Hutchinson, 2/6.

"Debunking" Luther is not a new task. Apart from the malignant myths about him whose absurdity has long ago been exposed, there are enough unpleasant facts to furnish generations of Catholic writers with material to prove him Satan's firstborn son. Protestants are apt to go to the other extreme and hail him as a saint. But Luther was neither saint nor fiend. All must admit that he was a man of great force of character, whose influence for good or for evil on his own and subsequent generations has been enormous.

Mr. Peter F. Wiener, a British subject of German origin, believes that Luther's career has been a disaster for both Christianity and civilization. Luther is "Hitler's spiritual ancestor." Mr. Wiener gives ample quotations from Luther's many writings which convict him of sponsoring everything the Nazi pseudo-philosophy has stood for: Pan-Germanism, the inferiority of women and the denial of any value to them except as breeders and sex-mates, anti-Semitism, utter subservience of the individual to the State, and the State's moral irresponsibility. Luther, like the Nazis, advocates two moralities—that which links individual with individual in private life, and the morality (if it can be called such) which individuals as agents (rather, functions) of the State should practise.

The many inconsistencies of Luther have called in question his sincerity. But it is impossible to doubt that the man who challenged Tetzel and condemned the sale of indulgences, and who boldly confronted the princes assembled at the Diet of Worms, was sincere. Luther's mind was a whirlpool of conflicting ideas and emotions. A craving for blind faith and a proneness to superstition struggled with the rationalism that from time to time made its voice heard. A fear lest reason should destroy his cherished creed made him rage at it as "the whore of the Devil."

Luther denied salvation through the merit of good works. The accumulation of merit had grown into a gigantic business, which enriched the Catholic hierarchy. The grace of God was put up for sale. Luther saw no way out of this traffic in human hopes and fears except in the denial of all merit on the part of a depraved race, whose only chance of

salvation came through faith in Christ's atonement. Faith could not fail to bear the fruit of good works. But Luther knew only too well that, though he was justified by faith, sin was always present with him. So he insisted that no sins, however dreadful, could separate the believer from his Lord. It would appear, then, that sin didn't really matter, and Luther sometimes used language that was bound to be so interpreted by many of his readers.

The widespread Antinomianism he involuntarily provoked shocked him. The 'doctrine of justification by faith only logically dispensed with the need of priests and a sacramental system. But when the Anabaptists arose to show him by their religious licence the implications of his loudly proclaimed creed, Luther furiously called on the State to crush alike new heretic and old Papist. The incoherent Catholicism to which he clung he deemed it blasphemous for anybody to disown.

The wretched peasants of Germany looked to the new Gospel to secure them freedom from their cruel and tyrannical lords. But Luther only hounded the oppressors on to further oppression.

In 1523 he wrote that Christians should use towards the Jews "Christ's law of love." But some years later he is found demanding the destruction of their homes, their synagogues, and their sacred books. Slavery, violence, even bloodshed seemed to him quite lawful if employed against the crucifiers of Christ. Did the age-long persistence of Judaism in the face of a hostile Christendom stir uncomfortably in the soul of Luther the harlot reason which he had tried so hard to put to sleep?

Some of Luther's remarks on women and sex are coarse in the extreme. One is not surprised at his pornographical vocabulary, his lavish praise of sensuality, and his incitements to violence when one contemplates the picture of his bestial death-mask, which Mr. Wiener reproduces. The engraving by Lucas Cranach (also reproduced) shows a very different man. It may well be an idealization by a sympathiser of the youthful Luther. But perhaps the artist caught some finer traits of character which had not yet been blurred by the degeneracy that grew with age.

A. D. HOWELL SMITH.

NO FRIEND OF DEMOCRACY. By Edith Moore. International Publishing Co., 1/-.

HITLER ET LE CHRISTIANISME. Par Edmond Vermeil. Londres, Editions Penguin, 2/6.

The Roman Catholic Church is, amongst other things, the biggest and oldest established business in the world to-day. It has important economic interests in most countries and must necessarily be concerned with changes in the social order anywhere which threaten its privileges. This aspect of the institution has acquired increasing prominence during the centuries of its slow decline. The creative energies of Catholicism have long since been exhausted. Its teaching is only a senile murmur-

ing in a dead language of the dim formulas of long ago. To the normal person of to-day, not specially indoctrinated, this teaching is not only incredible but, so far as it has any meaning at all, astonishing and absurd. Hence the necessity for the Church, at any cost, to keep a grip on the education of the young. Failing this there would be a catastrophic fall in the demand for salvation, sacraments, indulgences, happy deaths and other world-famous products of the Firm. Furthermore, it is quite essential that the enormous revenue of the Church from state subsidies and endowments in various lands, required for its propaganda and political activity, should be maintained. It is not difficult to see how these necessities determine the present-day policy of the Church. The most fearful threat to its existence comes from Bolshevism, which cuts off its economic and cultural privileges and places Roman Catholicism on an equal footing with other religious and anti-religious views. It will not be surprising therefore to find that according to the Catholic Press the Soviet State represents the extreme of human wickedness. On the other hand, the Catholic clergy are nowhere so contented as in clerical-fascist states such as Portugal or Spain, where the Church is richly endowed and given complete control of education, while all criticism is suppressed by the police, and active socialists are imprisoned or killed as soon as their opinions are discovered.

Miss Moore's booklet, first published in 1941, with a preface by Mr. Joseph McCabe, who has done so much to explain the nature of Catholicism past and present, illustrates the politics of the Catholic Church to-day with a wealth of documentary evidence. Even readers who know well in a general way what to expect from the Church will be surprised and occasionally amused by the texts she has collected. The Pontifical style is well exemplified in the message which Pope Pius XII sent to Franco and his dreadful associates on the occasion of their bloody victory (with the aid of Hitler, Mussolini, and Chamberlain) over the Spanish people.

"With great joy," writes the Holy Father, "we address you, dearest sons of Catholic Spain, to express our paternal congratulation for the gift of peace and victory, with which God has chosen to crown the Christian heroism of your faith and charity, proved in so much and so generous suffering . . . the healthy Spanish people, with the characteristics of its most noble spirit, with generosity and frankness, rose decided to defend the ideals of faith and Christian civilization, deeply rooted in the rich soil of Spain. As a pledge to the bountiful grace which you will receive from the Immaculate Virgin and the Apostle James, patrons of Spain, and which you will merit from the great Spanish saints, we give to you, our dear sons of Catholic Spain, to the Head of the State and his illustrious Government, to the zealous Episcopate and its self-denying clergy, to the heroic combatants and to all the faithful, our apostolic benediction."

These words of fulsome praise to one of the three most notorious mass murderers in Europe reminds us how little the Papacy has changed

since Gregory XIII went in 1572 with his cardinals to St. Peter's to sing a *Te Deum* for the massacre of St. Bartholomew, an event which he also commemorated by striking a medal and proclaiming a jubilee year.

The dear son of Spain responded as desired. He renewed the pre-republican state subsidies to the Church, restored the property of the Jesuits, brought the priests back into the schools, abolished divorce and civil marriage, and prohibited all centres of information on birth control. To-day the Church has again complete control of education in Spain.

Miss Moore reviews and illustrates the attitude of the Church to Italian Fascism, to Hitler's Reich, to Austria and Spain, to the conquest of Abyssinia, to the League of Nations, and to the war against the Axis up to 1941. The story is much the same everywhere. Dolfuss and Salazar, Father Tito, Pétain, Mussolini and Franco, the defenders of privilege against the common people, are necessarily also the exponents of Catholic policy in the epoch of democracy and free thought.

It would, of course, be simple-minded to expect that argument or evidence of any kind would dissuade the Roman Catholic press from repeating anti-Soviet lies such as that of the Katyn massacre of 70,000 Polish prisoners by the Red Army, floated with such success by the late Dr. Goebbels; or induce the Roman Catholic clergy to permit free discussion where they have power to prevent it. The Catholic racket can be countered only by political action. Information such as that supplied so interestingly by Miss Moore is an aid in preparing the public for the necessary steps as occasion arises at home or abroad. The fact, reported in an appendix, that copies of the book were abstracted by the New Zealand censor from a package sent from London is an involuntary testimony to its effectiveness. It is stated that the New Zealand Controller of Censorship happens to be a Roman Catholic.

Professor Vermeil's book is entirely concerned with Germany. It traces the development of religious pan-Germanism and its inevitable conflict with the German Christian churches. Although that chapter has been closed by history, its lesson remains instructive, and this scholarly essay has lost little of its original interest. Professor Vermeil attaches special importance to the clash of ideas between Hitlerism and Catholicism, but it may be questioned whether the battle was really about the grand principles inscribed on their respective banners. Hitler's imperialism came into direct collision with the spiritual imperialism of Rome on the question as to which should monopolise the mind of youth. Hitler won, but Hitler is dead. The battle for the mind of Germany's children will have to be fought again with consequences of the first importance not only for Germany but for Europe.

JOHN MURPHY.

RE-MAKING GERMANY. By Mary Saran, Willi Eichler, Wilhelm Heidorn, Minna Specht. International Publishing Company, 9d.

The established fronts of international solidarity (socialist, christian, cultural, commercial) have proved a feeble obstruction to national policies

and have mocked the faith that has been put in them. Nevertheless, they have an instructive history and in one way and another have done a good deal to mitigate hostility and remove misunderstanding. The faith that is attached to them in spite of bitter experience is not derisory. Especially has the faith in international socialism a reasonable expectation of fulfilment in the Europe which is now painfully taking shape. Those socialist groups which have lived in exile in this country and studied and worked with our Labour Party during the war have a special contribution to make to this form of international reconstruction, for they are in the best position to formulate a common socialist policy on the questions touching their own country, based on universal socialist principles which it would be reasonable to expect all socialists to accept. The pamphlet under review has this special interest. It touches on the political and economic reconstruction of Germany, and the reconstruction of the trade unions and of education.

Mrs. Saran, discussing reparations, points out that amongst the skilled workers who will be particularly in demand for labour abroad there will be many anti-fascists and loyal trade unionists, and she goes on to insist that their rights must be safeguarded. "This will require some form of international control, since these workers will be in foreign countries where they have no rights as citizens. Standards must be agreed upon and the international trade union movement should insist that it has a say in fixing and controlling them." The point applies the logic of her general argument: that reparations are justified, but not as a form of punishment for war guilt. Willi Eichler, discussing the revival of the free trade unions, also insists on the responsibility of the international trade union movement for watching over, assisting, and vouching for the new unions. He makes the point that in the course of creating German democracy from within it will be necessary to undertake a thorough removal of the many enemies of German democracy from positions of influence, and that this is not likely to be achieved without social disturbances. What will be the attitude of the occupying authorities? And of the socialist and trade union movements in other countries?

The chapter on economic reconstruction is very clearly and fairly argued. Mr. Heidorn describes the structure of German industry and its part in German aggression, and the measures which will be necessary to deal with the monopolies and to guarantee the peace. He faces the far-reaching consequences of reparations, and pleads (not too hopefully) for a general policy for European reconstruction which would take into account reparations and the general balance of trade, and promote the economic development of the backward European countries. He regards this as a radical measure of security, eliminating the danger of German predominance and of the rivalry of an Eastern and Western *bloc*.

Minna Specht, who has made herself widely respected in this country by the quality of her own pioneer work in education, writes on the prob-

lem of German education and sums up her recognition of the difficulties by recalling the dictum: "Education is never more necessary than when it seems utterly hopeless." At the first there is no possibility of full-scale formal teaching. The main thing is to give the children "security and activity," and local committees must everywhere be formed to take responsibility for this, satisfying the occupation authorities about what they are doing and going to do. "The children must feel that life has not come to a standstill, that there is a new community which is determined to liquidate the evil legacy of the Nazis and to act, however great the difficulties." This local social initiative is not at all *faute de mieux*; it is a primary educational influence, and the essential foundation of the school-teaching which is to come. She discusses special treatment of children from the school camps, and of those from the Adolf Hitler Schools and from the ranks of the army itself. Given a sensible, and when necessary an expert, approach, the abnormal psychological condition of these children should prove remediable in most cases; they can become normal citizens, they are not a lost generation. But for those who cannot be reclaimed there must be no recurrence this time of opportunities for lawless adventuring. H.J.B.

FREEDOM FOR SPAIN. By Charles Duff, Mauri Codina, Arturo Barea, Edith Moore, Garcia Pradas, W. Carrillo. International Publishing Company, 9d.

The fascination of the six brief articles collected in this political pamphlet of 32 pages is astonishing. It is the fascination of Spain, illuminated by sidelights thrown by individual Spanish views. Even the uninformed reader will get from these few pages a vivid impression of the character of the Spanish problem, seen in the long view of history, in the short view which recalls the recent past, and in a close-up of the stark present-day actualities. The striking impressions come by the way, for there is no systematic treatment. The pith of the pamphlet is in four articles which deal with the Agrarian System, the Theocracy, Spanish Anarchism, and the future of the Spanish Labour Movement. These last two are by former leading officials of the two main branches of the trade union movement in Spain.

Freedom for Spain means, as a beginning, the secularization of the State, a drastic purge and re-orientation of the army, police, and civil service, and elimination of the economic and political power of the big landed interests. How such a revolution is to be carried through in face of a formidable and consolidated tyranny controlling every means of power is indeed a question. However, the régime has lost its partners abroad, is inefficient, and unpopular. Spanish fascism is not a modern totalitarian system; certainly not a mass society ruled by an oligarchy of technicians. The discredit of the régime abroad, its oppression, inefficiency, and unpopularity at home, and the determination of the organized Left, underground and in exile, to overthrow it have decided

its ultimate fate; and such a doom as it becomes plainer, increasingly alters the situation.

The doctrinaire habit of thought which prevailed among Left organizations before and during the civil war and did so much to confuse their policy and undermine their discipline still lingers, although chastened, and will have to be reckoned with. Mr. Codina, writing on the Agrarian System, insists that the actual conditions and problems make any doctrinaire solution inapplicable and unworkable. However, a fruitful empiricism can hardly be developed save under pressure from the responsibilities of office and the exigencies of the situation. Meanwhile, the Spanish Labour Movement must produce and attract capable, experienced men with local knowledge who have devoted themselves to concrete studies.

Finally, the black record of the Roman Catholic Church in Spain, faithfully recalled by Miss Edith Moore, should not be overlooked, nor extenuated. Undoubtedly the Christian church in Spain is not lacking in Christian charity; but nothing can redeem, and nothing must obscure, the hellish iniquity of the Roman Catholic Church in using all the resources of secular power to enforce her claim to the exclusive domination of conscience and habit. Her peculiarly odious degradation of men deserves more hatred than even the cynicism of the Nazis. There are many Christians as well as rationalists who devoutly hope that the time is not far distant when she will be taught a severe lesson in Spain.

H.J.B.

REPORT OF FIVE YEARS OF GERMAN OCCUPATION. By Jurat John Leale, President of the Controlling Committee, States of Guernsey.

RESISTANCE IN NORWAY. By Diderich Lund. War Resisters' International, 2d.

WHEN the history of the German occupation of Europe is written it will probably be at that time of greater interest to many readers than a history of the campaigns and policies and calculations by which Germany lost the war; for the history of the various occupations will be a history of the inner politics of the war, a study of its complex spiritual character on both sides. Hence the importance and present interest of all the scraps of documentary evidence which contribute to the sources of that history.

The occupation of the Channel Islands was not comparable with that of the mainland. For that very reason the account of it is suggestive. On the one side there were no quislings and could be no *Maquis*; on the other side there was no use for a Gestapo and no occasion for atrocities. Mr. Leale, President of the Controlling Committee, responsible for the Island's relations with the Germans, from the first founded himself upon international law: he and the islanders would adhere to the letter and spirit of the Hague Convention and would expect and demand that the Germans should do the same. "We espoused the Hague Convention 'for

better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health.' To have flirted with the Convention would have been to have displayed bad morals and a patriotism based purely on opportunism . . . We were a small community under the German Army, cut off from the rest of the world. The Hague Convention is real and solid. When you have it on your side, you feel less alone. It is something of civilisation which war with all its brutality cannot expel." Throughout the long years of occupation he maintained that line and sustained his part with courage and vigour, persistently pressing for the rights and interests of the islanders, and accepting and fulfilling his responsibility to the occupying authority. Aid to and sabotage of the German war effort were equally eschewed. The Germans responded. International law not only gave moral strength and a consistent policy to the occupied island, but also it never failed to carry moral authority with the enemy as the accepted principles by which relations were to be governed. The Germans wished not to seem lower in their standards than the British. They were susceptible to this appeal, and proved not much less correct in their observance of international law than Mr. Leale, who, for his part, had determined to make relations such that both sides when the war should be over could remember them without shame and without resentment.

Could this antique model have been found elsewhere? In France, even in Norway, the political situation was not nearly so simple as it was in Guernsey. Nor was it so easy to forget the black iniquity of the Nazi system in theory and in practice. Even Mr. Lund, a member of the W.R.I., recognised that this was a war in which the pacifist had to take sides, that no compromise was morally possible: he believed in open resistance to German orders, complete non-co-operation. It remains a question whether or not in the long run such a policy was wiser or more effective than that which Mr. Leale was able to follow. At any rate, early in 1944 the death rate among the soldiers in Guernsey was higher than that among the islanders; after four years of occupation they were faring better than the enemy.

Among the many interesting points which emerge from Mr. Leale's speech is the insight which he gives into the practical working of the *Herrenvolk* idea. The Germans in their world outlook were like flunkeys in society, respecting the "best," the established people, despising the rest. These latter were naturally fit only for service; and the bullet or the gas chamber might be an equally natural alternative convenient to their masters. This view is not in the least incompatible with the most correct behaviour in relations with the upper members of upper-class nations. The moral authority of international law in this case has nothing to do with the moral authority of the Rights of Man. It is the moral authority of correct manners.

H.J.B.

TO THE READER

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